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I. INTRODUCTION
Women are entering the workplace in ever increasing numbers.I
As a result of increased interaction among men and women in the
workplace, the number of sexual harassment claims has risen dra-
matically.2 Women are most often the targets of sexual harassment.
3
One primary reason for the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in
the workplace is that men regard conduct, ranging from sexual innu-
1. Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm,
8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 333 (1990).
2. See generally ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND
PRACTICE 3-4 (1991). The table below illustrates the sexual harassment charges filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) since 1980:
1
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endo to sexual demands, differently than women.4 Conduct that
many men view as ordinary and unobjectionable may offend a
woman. 5
The standard for evaluating the appropriateness of conduct in the
workplace has been the "reasonable man standard," or more re-
cently, the "reasonable person standard."6 The factfinder is asked to
decide whether a reasonable person would consider the objectiona-
ble conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of
employment so as to create a hostile working environment. 7
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit asserted that the reasonable woman
standard should be applied in assessing conduct alleged in sexual
harassment claims.S A three-judge panel maintained that the court
should focus on the perspective of the victim and evaluate the vic-
tim's perspective against a reasonable perspective of an individual of
the same gender.9 The court's reasoning in support of the reason-
able woman standard centered on the fundamental differences in
FISCAL YEAR CHARGES FILED
1980 75
1981 3812
1982 4433
1983 4709
1984 5158
1985 5812
1986 5924
1987 6775
1988 7037
Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 6.
4. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1210 (1989).
5. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) [hereinafter MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT]; Jim Kennedy, American Workplace Is Changed Forever, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
21, 1991, at IB (reporting results of a California survey where "75 percent of men
found sexual advances in the workplace to be flattering, while 75 percent of women
found such advances offensive").
6. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 21 (1988). The standard was first articulated as a reasonable man standard,
or a man of "ordinary prudence" in tort law. Courts recognized the original stan-
dard's overt sexism; therefore, generally courts now use the reasonable person stan-
dard. See also Paul, supra note 1, at 362 n. 116. The reasonable person standard is
nothing more than the reasonable man standard converted to nonsexist language.
7. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991); see also Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
8. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
9. Id. at 878. The court stated, "courts should consider the victim's perspective
and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior." Id. (citing EEOC Compl. Man.
(CCH) § 615, at 3242 (1988)). A female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile
environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman
"would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment." Id. at 880.
[Vol. 18
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perspectives of women and men.' 0
This Note first examines the historical development of sexual har-
assment as a cause of action.t" Second, this Note discusses the con-
cept of the reasonable woman and surveys recent cases expressly
adopting the reasonable woman standard as a method of evaluating
conduct in sexual harassment cases. Finally, this Note illustrates why
adopting the reasonable woman standard will reduce sexual harass-
ment and create greater equality in the workplace.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Sexual Harassment as a Cause of Action
1. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196412 was enacted in order to
provide equal opportunity through the removal of artificial barriers
to employment.' 3  In part, Title VII makes it unlawful for an
employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her or]
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify [her or] his employees
10. Id. at 879-81; see also CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 219-22 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY]. For other
works stressing the importance of feminist theory in shaping legal standards, see
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DE-
VELOPMENT (1982) (offering a scholarly study exposing biases in our knowledge due
to unstated male norms); Holly B. Fechner, Toward an Expanded Conception of Law Re-
form: Sexual Harassment Law and the Reconstruction of Facts, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 475
(1990); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality,
Sex Diferences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983); Christine A. Littleton, In
Search of a FeministJurisprudence, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1987); Martha Minow, Fem-
inist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988); Martha Minow,Justice
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Deborah L. Rhode, Gender andJurisprudence:
An Agenda for Research, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 521 (1987); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986) [hereinafter Scales, Essay];
Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981); Mark
Seidenfeld, Some Jurisprudential Perspectives on Employment Sex Discrimination Law and
Comparable Worth, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 269 (1990).
11. The term sexual harassment was not commonly used until 1975 or 1976.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 5, at 27-28, 259 n.13. MacKinnon, a
well-known feminist writer and activist, has been credited with popularizing the term,
increasing the awareness of the problem, and inspiring changes in sexual discrimina-
tion law.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
13. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-430 (1971); see also Abrams,
supra note 4, at 1186 ("In the struggle to gain access to broader job opportunities,
the primary litigation tool was Title VII .... ).
1992]
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• . . in any way which would deprive... any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [her or] his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.14
Congress added the word "sex" to Title VII as a last minute amend-
ment on the floor of the House of Representatives.15 Therefore,
there is virtually no legislative history to provide guidance to courts
in interpreting the prohibition of sexual discrimination.' 6 Courts,
however, have tended to interpret Title VII rather broadly.
17
2. Creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) as the administrative body governing Title VII. The
EEOC administers and enforces all federal laws prohibiting discrimi-
nation in the workplace.18 This authority includes investigating
complaints of discrimination and then attempting conciliation. The
EEOC has published Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 19 which
is considered an administrative interpretation of Title VII. The
Guidelines, "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may properly resort to
guidance."20
In 1980, the EEOC amended its Guidelines on Discrimination Because
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
applies to businesses with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
15. The word "sex" was added by a floor amendment by Rep. Smith, an oppo-
nent of Title VII, on February 8, 1964. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-82, 2851 (1964).
16. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
(stating that Congress chose not to enumerate specific discriminatory practices and,
as such, its intention was to define discrimination as broadly as possible), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 957 (1972). Judicial interpretation of the prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation has been largely a self-guided process, with almost no legislative history avail-
able to assist the courts. CoNTE, supra note 2, at 12.
17. See Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)
("Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.").
18. Paul, supra note 1, at 334 n.6. The EEOC may bring a civil suit against an
employer when it cannot otherwise resolve the issue. As an alternative, the EEOC
may issue a "right to sue" letter to the complainant, who may then, in turn, pursue
his or her complaint in the courts. See CoN-rE, supra note 2, at 13-14. The EEOC was
created as a bipartisan commission with primary responsibility for the administration
and enforcement of all federal laws prohibiting discrimination in employment.
19. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991).
20. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)). The Supreme Court has said that the guidelines are entitled to great defer-
ence. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
[Vol. 18
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of Sex to include sexual harassment.21 These guidelines provide the
following definition of sexual harassment:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual har-
assment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either ex-
plicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
2 2
The amended guidelines helped solidify judicial acceptance of this
cause of action.23 As a result, many more victims were encouraged
to submit claims of sexual harassment.24 Today, sexual harassment
21. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991).
22. Id. According to some feminist theorists, a better definition centers on the
concept of power. Some feminists argue that sexual harassment is one aspect of the
patriarchal system, in which values are male-defined and men possess great sexual as
well as economic power. CorTE, supra note 2, at 4. Catherine MacKinnon describes
sexual harassment as "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the con-
text of a relationship of unequal power. Central to the concept is the use of power
derived from one social sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another."
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 5, at 1.
In addition to defining sexual harassment, federal and state agencies publish lists
of the main forms of sexual harassment in the workplace. The Minnesota Depart-
ment of Human Rights, the state agency responsible for investigating and adminis-
tering state discrimination claims, published the following list of the main forms of
sexual harassment:
1. Unwanted or unnecessary touching;
2. Grabbing;
3. Cornering;
4. Kissing or hugging;
5. Sexual remarks or suggestions;
6. Unwanted sexual compliments;
7. Pornographic pictures or stories, dirty jokes;
8. Offensive displays of sex-related objects;
9. Demanding sexual favors accompanied by implied or overt threats,
such as those regarding conditions of employment;
10. Repeated belittling, demeaning, insulting remarks because of sex;
11. Unequal application of performance standards, discipline or work
rules because of sex;
12. Sabotaging an employee's character, reputation, work efforts because
of sex;
13. Unequal assignment of the "dirty work," less responsible or less chal-
lenging duties not based on abilities, because of sex.
MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct. 13, 1991, at 5A.
23. See Paul, supra note 1, at 333; see also Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976) (first district court case to hold that sexual harassment was discrimina-
tory treatment within the meaning of Title VII).
24. See CoNrE, supra note 2, at 3.
1992]
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is a rapidly expanding area of the law.25
The EEOC has recognized two different forms of sexual harass-
ment.26 In quid pro quo harassment cases, employers or direct su-
pervisors condition tangible employment benefits on sexual favors.27
In hostile environment cases, tangible, economic benefits are unaf-
fected, yet employees work in offensive or abusive environments.28
Courts recognized quid pro quo cases as involving a loss of a tan-
gible economic benefit. For example, a tangible benefit may include
termination, transfer, delay or denial ofjob benefits, or adverse per-
formance appraisals.29 In a typical quid pro quo case, a supervisor
relies on his or her apparent or actual authority to extort some sort
of sexual consideration from an employee.30
Hostile environment cases are often called "absolute," "intangi-
ble" or "non-economic" sexual harassment cases. 3 Both the lan-
guage of Title VII and the EEOC Guidelines fully support the idea
that sexual harassment leading to non-economic injury may violate
Title VII.32 In deciding that hostile environment harassment vio-
lates Title VII, the EEOC relied on a substantial body of judicial de-
cisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII affords
employees the right to work in an environment free from discrimina-
tory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.33
25. See id. at 1-9.
26. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991).
27. See e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.NJ.
1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). During a business lunch at which an office
worker and her employer were discussing the employee's future promotion, the em-
ployer suddenly made sexual advances. When the employee rejected her employer's
propositions, he attempted to physically restrain her from leaving the table. Soon
afterward, the office worker was threatened with physical harm, demoted and eventu-
ally fired. Id. at 555.
28. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 907-08 (11 th Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing that constructive discharge occurred when an employee involuntarily resigned to
avoid a hostile work environment); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir.
1981); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 604-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In
Sage Realty Corp., a lobby attendant, whose sexually revealing uniform attracted com-
ments, gestures, and propositions from passersby experienced intangible sexual har-
assment in its most general form. Id. In Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp.
894, (D.N.J. 1978), a female industrial engineer became a victim of intangible harass-
ment when colleagues bombarded her with sexual jokes, made remarks about her
marital status and virginity, and drew an obscene cartoon to humiliate her. Id. at 934.
29. See CoNTE, supra note 2, at 16.
30. Id. at 34.
31. See Christine 0. Merriman, Note, Employer Liability for Co- Worker Sexual Harass-
ment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 85 (1984-85).
32. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (stating that nothing
in Title VII limits claims to economic injury).
33. Id. at 65; see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 957 (1972). Rogers was the first case to recognize a cause of action based
upon a discriminatory or hostile work environment. The court held that a Hispanic
[Vol. 18
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The two forms of sexual harassment, quid pro quo and hostile en-
vironment, often occur simultaneously.34 For example, the failure to
comply with sexual demands of an employer or co-worker may lead
to the creation of a hostile or abusive environment in addition to a
quid pro quo claim.35 As a result, most complaints allege both quid
pro quo and hostile environment harassment.3 6
The EEOC Guidelines also describe situations constituting sexual
harassment in the workplace.37 Under the guidelines' broad defini-
tion of sexual harassment,38 a determination is made as to whether a
type of conduct constitutes sexual harassment.S9 Generally, the
"Commission will look at the .. totality of the circumstances, such
as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the
alleged incidents occurred."40 Several courts have recognized that
not all conduct in the workplace may be described as sexual harass-
ment within the meaning of Title VII,41 however, conduct which is
sufficiently severe may be actionable. 42 Today, most courts recog-
nize that the EEOC Guidelines are an effective tool in analyzing sex-
ual harassment claims and therefore accord them deference. 4s
complainant could establish a Title VII violation by demonstrating that her employer
created an offensive work environment for employees by giving discriminatory ser-
vice to its clientele. Id. at 238-39. Rogers was the seminal case on hostile work envi-
ronment claims because the court recognized that Title VII protects both an
employee's psychological and economic well-being from discrimination. Id. at 238.
34. See CoNrE, supra note 2, at 15.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 15-16 & n.29.
37. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1991).
38. The EEOC Guidelines state:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harrassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term
or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection
of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment deci-
sions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991).
39. See Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Har-
assment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1469 (1986).
40. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1991).
41. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972) ("mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in an employee" would not affect the conditions of employment to a degree
to constitute sexual harassment within the meaning of Title VII); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982).
42. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
43. See CONTE, supra note 2, at 41-46.
19921
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3. Elements of a Sexual Harassment Claim
To prevail in a sexual harassment claim, either quid pro quo or
hostile environment, a plaintiff must show that
(1) she [or he] belongs to a protected group, (2) she [or he] was
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment was
based on sex, (4) the harassment affected a "term, condition, or
privilege" of employment, and (5) the employer knew or should
have known of the harassment in question and failed to take proper
remedial action.44
The element most often in dispute is whether the activities com-
plained of are unwelcome or affect a term, condition or privilege of
employment.45 The plaintiff must demonstrate that the unwelcome
actions were "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment. ' 46 Conduct must be "unwelcome" in the sense that the em-
ployee did not invite or solicit it. 4 7
Evidence provided by other employees that helps to establish a
pattern or practice of sexual harassment is relevant to show a hostile
work environment.48 Clearly, evidence of repeated abuse will help
to bolster a plaintiff's claim;49 however, under certain circumstances,
a finding of sexual harassment could result from "isolated, sporadic,
44. Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309 n.3 (5th Cir.
1987); see also Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Flag-
ship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 721 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Moy-
lan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986); Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
45. Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749.
46. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a female
worker who received several "bizarre" love letters from male co-worker sufficiently
demonstrated that the co-worker's conduct altered her work environment); Hall v.
Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that verbal abuse
and offensive touching by co-workers was sufficiently severe to alter conditions of
employment within the meaning of Title VII); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 253-54
(4th Cir. 1983) (holding that repeated sexual slurs, insults, and propositions by male
co-workers was sufficient to support the female air traffic controller's claim).
47. Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749.
48. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415-16 (10th Cir. 1987); see
also Jones, 793 F.2d at 721 n.7 (holding that incidents of sexual harassment reported
by other females bear on plaintiff's claim only if there was evidence that incidents
affected plaintiff's psychological well-being), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).
49. "Although a single act can be enough, generally, repeated incidents create a
stronger claim of hostile environment, with the strength of the claim depending on
the number of incidents and the intensity of each incident." King v. Board of Re-
gents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); accord Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990); Carrero v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863
F.2d 1503, 1510-11 (llth Cir. 1989).
[Vol. 18
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or insulting incidents."50 Courts have also held that the requisite
acts underlying sexual harassment claims need not be clearly sexual
in nature.5 1 For example, "Intimidation and hostility toward women
because they are women can obviously result from conduct other
than explicit sexual advances."52
The question of whether the employer knew or should have known
of the alleged harassment and failed to take proper remedial action53
is an issue often discussed by courts. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son, however, the Supreme Court declined to announce a specific
rule concerning employer liability under Title VII but suggested that
courts look to agency principles for guidance.
54
In situations of harassment by co-workers, the EEOC Guidelines
impose a "constructive knowledge" standard on the employer.55
When the allegations involve conduct of an agent or supervisor,
however, the EEOC Guidelines recommend a standard of strict lia-
bility, irrespective of employee knowledge. 56
Under the EEOC Guidelines, employer liability remains unclear
and must be analyzed on a case by case basis.57 Generally, an em-
ployer will not be held liable for sexual harassment by coworkers if
reasonable actions are taken to end the harassment.58 An important
factor to consider is whether the employer had an effective internal
complaint procedure.59 Such grievance procedures to investigate
and remedy difficult situations may lessen the hostility of the work
environment.
50. Merriman, supra note 32, at 95.
51. See, e.g., Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1415 (holding that evidence of threats of physical
violence and incidents of verbal abuse were properly considered).
52. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988).
53. See EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(d) (1991).
54. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). In determining an em-
ployer's liability for sexual harassment by an employee, the Supreme Court stated:
While such common-law principals may not be transferable in all their par-
ticulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include
"agent" of an employer, surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the
acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1988)).
55. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d), (e) (1991).
56. Id. § 1604.11 (c).
57. Id. § 1604.11 (c). The EEOC agreed that employers should always be respon-
sible for acts of quid pro quo sexual harassment. However, hostile environment
claims must be evaluated on a case by case basis to determine if the employer knew,
or should have known, about the conduct and was thus directly responsible. Id.; see
also CONTE, supra note 2, at 68.
58. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1991).
59. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), § 615, 3114 (1990).
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4. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
In Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson,60 the United States Supreme
Court expressly recognized that sexual harassment constitutes sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.61 The Court unanimously held that a hostile environment, as
well as quid pro quo harassment, violates Title VII.62 The decision
is important because the Court legitimized this area of the law for
complainants and, for the first time, put employers on notice that
unwelcome sexual conduct will not be tolerated in the workplace. 6 3
In Meitor, Mechelle Vinson brought an action against the bank
and her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, alleging that, during her four
years at the bank, she had been constantly harassed by Taylor in vio-
lation of Title VII. Vinson alleged that, shortly after she began work-
ing at the bank, Taylor began making repeated sexual advances
toward her.64 After refusing initially, she submitted to Taylor's sex-
ual advances because she feared dismissal.65 Vinson did not report
the harassment to Taylor's supervisors because she was afraid of
him.66 He had repeatedly threatened her life and forcibly raped her
several times.67
The Court concluded that Vinson's allegations contained not only
excessive harassment but "criminal conduct of the most serious na-
60. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
61. Id. at 73. In 1985, Justice Clarence Thomas, then chairman of the EEOC,
played a key role in urging the Reagan Administration to take a strong stand against
sexual harassment in the workplace when the issue came before the United States
Supreme Court. While federal law made clear that sexist behavior was illegal if it
caused a victim to lose his or her job or a promotion, the Supreme Court had not
ruled on whether sexual harassment alone violated antidiscrimination laws. Thomas
compared forcing a woman to work in a hostile environment to "forcing a Jewish
employee to work in an office covered with Nazi memorabilia." David G. Savage,
Thomas Urged Reagan Administration to Toughen Stand Against Harassment, MPLS. STAR
TRIB., Oct. 10, 1991, at 6A.
62. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-69. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor, with concur-
ring opinions by Stevens and Marshall. Justice Marshall agreed with the majority
concerning the legitimacy of a hostile environment claim but disagreed with the stan-
dard of liability applied to the employer. Id. at 74-78.
63. CONTE, supra note 2, at 52.
64. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1980). Both
Taylor and the bank denied all of the allegations. Id. at 39.
65. Id. at 38. In addition to 40 to 50 instances of sexual intercourse, Vinson
testified that Taylor fondled her breasts and buttocks in front of other employees,
followed her into the women's room when she was there alone, exposed himself to
her, and raped her several times. Id.
66. Id. at 39. Vinson also testified that Taylor touched and fondled other em-
ployees. Neither Vinson nor any other employees filed an internal complaint against
Taylor. Id. at 38-39.
67. Id. at 38.
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ture." 68 Mechelle Vinson's allegations were "plainly sufficient" to
state a claim for hostile environment harassment.69 The Court thor-
oughly discussed hostile environment sexual harassment claims, stat-
ing that the language of Title VII is not limited to "economic" or
"tangible" forms of discrimination such as benefits and privileges.70
In doing so, the Court supported the EEOC guidelines which con-
demn offensive sexual conduct in the workplace regardless of
whether a tangible job benefit is at issue.7'
B. Development of the Reasonable Woman Standard
The concept of a reasonable woman standard is not entirely new. 72
In 1955, author A.P. Herbert wrote humorously on the subject of the
reasonable woman. Herbert's court of appeals in the fictional case of
Fardell v. Potts announced that at common law, a reasonable woman
does not exist.73 Others have since disagreed. The differences in
male and female perspectives are often discussed in feminist juris-
prudence literature. Feminist theory begins with the concept of pa-
triarchy. 74 Generally, feminists believe that men have had the bulk
of power and have used that power to subordinate women. 7 5
Feminist writers have divided feminist legal literature into three
approaches. 76 The first approach focuses on formal equality for wo-
men. The goal of "first-phase feminism" is "the removal of legal
68. MeNtor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 63-69.
71. Id. at 62-67.
72. See United States v. Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cir. 1969) (dis-
cussing district court's use of reasonable woman standard in a suit against manufac-
turer of cosmetic product).
73. See A.P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW 1-6 (1955). The judge in Fardell v. Potts
found it difficult to apply the reasonable man standard to women.
[M]y own researches incline me to agree, that in all that mass of authorities
which bears upon this branch of the law there is no single mention of a
reasonable woman. It was ably insisted before us that such an omission,
extending over a century and more of judicial pronouncements, must be
something more than a coincidence; that among the innumerable tributes to
the reasonable man there might be expected at least some passing reference
to a reasonable person of the opposite sex; that no such reference is found,
for the simple reason that no such being is contemplated by law; that legally
at least there is no reasonable woman, and that therefore in this case the
learned judge should have directed the jury that, while there was evidence
on which they might find that the defendant had not come up to the stan-
dard required of a reasonable man, her conduct was only what was to be
expected of a woman ....
Id. at 5-6.
74. See Bender, supra note 6, at 5.
75. For example, men created the American political system, under which wo-
men were unable to vote until 1920. Id. at 6 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIX).
76. See NGAIRE NAFFINE, LAw & THE SEXES: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST JURISPRU-
DENCE 1 (1990).
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constraints on women and the acquisition of equal civil rights
designed to allow women to compete freely with men in the
marketplace."77
Second-phase feminists attack the law's claim of impartiality and
justice for all as "high-minded principles which legal men have em-
ployed as protective cover." 78 This approach defines the legal sys-
tem as a male view of society "which ignores and devalues the
priorities of women-those of human interdependence, human com-
passion and human need."79
Third-phase feminists believe that the law is male-dominated and
sex-biased.8O The male dominance, according to third-phase femi-
nists, is not uniform. The ideals which the law aspires to-namely
rational, logical, coherent, and autonomous rules-are largely
unachieved. The law is neither all pro-male nor anti-female, but,
rather, possesses irrationality, rationality, subjectiveness and objec-
tiveness in equal doses. "Vital dimensions of human existence, con-
ventionally associated with women, are missing from the law's
depiction of itself."81
Also, third-phase feminists believe that the legal system reflects
the patriarchal social order, which is not entirely coherent. This so-
cial order classifies women as a subordinate sex.8 2
According to Catherine MacKinnon, there are two paths to sexual
equality for women. The first path is for women to be the same as
men. This is termed "gender neutrality." 83 This path results in one
single, uniform standard, which completely discounts differences in
gender.
The second path is for women to be different from men. MacKin-
non calls this path the "special benefit rule" and suggests that it cre-
ates a second standard.84 The second path, namely the
"differences" path, "exists to value or compensate women for what
they are or have become distinctively as women." 85 MacKinnon ar-
gues that under the sameness path, men have essentially become the
measure of all things and women are evaluated according to their
correspondence with men. Under the differences path, women's
perspectives are taken into account and, as a result, women are eval-
uated more fairly.86 To achieve equality between women and men in
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 12.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id.
83. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 10, at 221.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Feminists agree that, not only are there differences in perspectives between
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the court system, courts must recognize that current standards are
biased against women.8 7 Adopting a reasonable woman standard
would effectively deal with this bias.
The reasonable woman standard is different from a reasonable
person standard.8 8 Most courts today use a reasonable person stan-
dard,89 which evolved from the reasonable man standard.90 The
change was an attempt to erase the sexism inherent in the term, but
feminist scholars find that "changing the word without changing the
underlying model" forces those who are different to conform to a
male model of reasonableness.9 t Thus, the reasonable woman stan-
dard approaches the law from the perspective of a woman, while the
reasonable person standard largely accommodates only a man's
perspective.92
An underlying assumption of the reasonable woman standard, and
of feminism itself, is that women and men perceive actions differ-
ently. What may not be sexual harassment from the perspective of a
man may be highly offensive and constitute sexual harassment from
the perspective of a woman. 93 The reasonable person standard con-
men and women, but the perspectives of both sexes must be represented "in the very
conception of what society is." E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN
158 (1980). In other words, true equality among the sexes will exist only when fe-
male perspectives "influence the operation and structure of all social, political and
economic institutions." Seidenfeld, supra note 10, at 283; see also Abrams, supra note
4, at 1181. Abrams argues that even successful attacks on the exclusion of women's
concerns have failed to enlighten society about the differences between men and wo-
men. The next step is to challenge the pervasive influence of male-centered norms
by adopting new analytical tools.
87. See MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 5, at 101-41. MacKinnon
argues that equality efforts should focus on challenging male-biased standards.
Other feminist writers agree. See Finley, supra note 10, at 1143-63; Scales, Essay, supra
note 10, at 1374-76, 1393-99. Scales argues that sexual equality concerns neither
similarities nor differences between men and women but instead the relative power
and social status of the sexes. Similarities and differences are only relevant insofar as
they are used as vehicles to perpetuate the hierarchy. Id. at 1390.
88. See Bender, supra note 6, at 20-25.
89. See 57A Am. JUR. 2D Negligence § 145 (1989).
90. In tort law, the standard was the reasonable man or man of ordinary pru-
dence. See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P. 1837).
91. See Bender, supra note 6, at 23-25. Although the language of tort law was
"neutered, made 'politically correct,' and sensitized," the content and character of
the standard remained the same, and "encourages conformism and the suppression
of different voices." Id. at 22-23.
92. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991).
93. Men and women respond to sex issues in the workplace to a degree that
exceeds normal differences in other perceptual reactions between them.
For example, research reveals a near flip-flop of attitudes when both men
and women were asked what their response would be to being sexually ap-
proached in the workplace. Approximately two-thirds of the men re-
sponded that they would be flattered; only fifteen percent would feel
insulted. For women the proportions are reversed.
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tains male-biased ideas of fairness. Cloaked in objectivity and ration-
ality, the law purports to apply equally. Some feminists argue that
objectivity in the law is not a reality.94 Rather, rationality and objec-
tivity are methods of reasoning reflecting the male influence in the
law.95 Author Ann Scales termed the male-biased standards "the
tyranny of objectivity."96 As a result, where women differ from men,
women cannot be judged by a standard containing male-biased no-
tions of fairness.
The reasonable person standard tends to be descriptive. In other
words, the standard reflects how people generally behave under par-
ticular circumstances. The reasonable person standard attempts to
establish a universally applicable measure for conduct.97 The rea-
sonable woman standard, on the other hand, appears prescriptive.
However, it is actually descriptive. The reasonable woman standard
reflects how reasonable women behave in the workplace. The rea-
sonable woman standard is an attempt to reflect the feminine view-
point as a basis for measuring conduct.98 For example, whether
sexual harassment exists should depend on whether a reasonable
woman would interpret the actions as sexual harassment. The stan-
dard may be slightly more discretionary, yet in cases of sexual harass-
ment, the standard would yield a fairer result by taking into account
concerns relevant to a woman that previously would not have been
considered.
Arguably, some judges may be threatened by a standard which
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, plaintiff's expert witness).
94. NAFFINE, supra note 76, at 12-19.
95. Scales, Essay, supra note 10, at 1376-80.
96. Id. at 1376.
97. Id. at 20.
98. See Gilligan, supra note 10, at 170. Gilligan states:
[Men] and women may speak different languages that they assume are the
same, using similar words to encode disparate experiences of self and social
relationships. Because these languages share an overlapping moral vocabu-
lary, they contain a propensity for systematic mistranslation, creating misun-
derstandings which impede communication and limit the potential for
cooperation and care in relationships....
As we have listened for centuries to the voices of men and theories of
development that their experience informs, so we have come more recently
to notice not only the silence of women but the difficulty in hearing what
* they say when they speak. Yet in the different voice of women lies the truth
of an ethic of care, the tie between relationship and responsibility, and the
origins of aggression in the failure of connection. The failure to see the
different reality of women's lives and to hear the differences in their voices
stems in part from the assumption that there is a single mode of social expe-
rience and interpretation. By positing instead two different modes, we ar-
rive at a more complex rendition of human experience which sees the truth
of separation and attachment in the lives of women and men and recognizes
how these truths are carried by different modes of language and thought.
Id. at 173-74.
[Vol. 18
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 18
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/18
REASONABLE WOMAN
could potentially be biased toward women. 99 These judges, how-
ever, must recognize that the law is presently biased toward men.' 0 0
Today, the man's norm still applies in most areas of the law.' 0 ' This
male norm contains attitudes of how women ought to act,' 0 2 and is
particularly inadequate in sexual harassment cases. Judicial wisdom
has been described as a combination of a sense of current social val-
ues and healthy pragmatism.103 Applying the reasonable woman
standard in sexual harassment cases affords judges an opportunity to
constructively utilize judicial wisdom and create a proper balance.
Today, women make up a significant percentage of the work force.
Yet little has been done to reduce discrimination in the workplace.
Title VII and various state human rights acts have only just begun to
help to provide relief from unfair, discriminatory practices. More
tools are needed to help women achieve equal pay, equal considera-
tion for advancement, and equal respect in the workplace. A primary
reason for pervasive discrimination in the workplace is that many
employers continue to play by the old rules. If courts provide new
rules that reflect the reality of the workplace today, the goal of equal-
ity in the workplace will be furthered.
C. Applications of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment
Actions
Courts have applied the reasonable woman standard in several ar-
eas of law. The reasonable woman standard has been discussed in
criminal law cases as it applies to the accused,04 rather than to the
victim, as in a sexual harassment case. For instance, ajury could take
the sex of the accused into account in assessing what might reason-
ably cause her to lose her self-control.105 The reasonable woman
99. Id.
100. See Martha T. McCluskey, Rethinking Equality and Diference: Disability Discrimina-
tion in Public Transportation, 97 YALE L.J. 863, 868-69 (1988). McCluskey writes that
feminists have exposed many problems of prejudice against women that the legal
system has largely ignored or condoned as completely natural, such as gender-bias in
the courts and sexual harassment in the workplace. Judges need to recognize that
norms are biased before changes can be made. Id.
101. See ToVE STANG DAHL, WoMAN's LAw: AN INTRODUCTION TO FEMINISTJURIs-
PRUDENCE 12 (Ronald L. Craig trans. 1987).
102. Id. at 12.
103. NAFFINE, supra note 76, at 39-40 (discussing the myth ofjudicial neutrality).
104. See State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (Wash. 1977). In Wanrow, the
court held that a female defendant's right to equal protection of the laws was violated
when, at the conclusion of her trial for homicide, the judge instructed the jury to
evaluate her claim of self-defense in light of a reasonable man standard rather than a
reasonable woman standard. Id. at 558-59.
105. See M.J. Willoughby, Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can a Battered Woman
Claim Self-Defense When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer?, 38 KAN. L. REV. 169, 176 n.30
(1989) (discussing a reasonable woman's perception of a threat and how her percep-
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standard has also been discussed as pertaining specifically to the ele-
ment of force in rape cases. 106
The reasonable woman standard has also been discussed in the
area of torts. 10 7 For example, in a medical malpractice case, a fed-
eral district court in Pennsylvania applied an objective reasonable
woman standard.1 0 8 The court instructed the jury as to whether a
reasonable woman, aware of all the possible risks and complications,
would have consented to a hysterectomy.109 The reasonable woman
standard also has been adopted by several circuits as the appropriate
standard for judging gender-related conduct. 010
1. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.
In 1986, Judge Keith of the Sixth Circuit first discussed the reason-
able woman standard as it pertains to sexual harassment in his vigor-
ous dissent in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. " I Vivienne Rabidue was
discharged for job-related problems including her "irrascible and
opinionated personality and her inability to work harmoniously with
co-workers and customers.""l 2 The court found, however, that
Rabidue's supervisor was an extremely vulgar individual who "rou-
tinely referred to women as 'cunt,' 'whores,' 'pussy,' and 'tits,' " and,
on occasion, directed such obscenities to Rabidue. l1 Despite these
factual findings, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclu-
tion may differ from the traditional reasonable man standard, especially in battered
women cases).
106. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1107 n.49 (1986). Professor Es-
trich discusses various state statutes' use of the reasonable woman standard in rape
cases. The question becomes "whether the force was sufficient to overcome a rea-
sonable woman's will to resist. Prohibited force turns on the judge's evaluation of a
reasonable woman's response." Id. at 1108.
107. See Bender, supra note 6, at 20-25, for an interesting discussion concerning
the use of the reasonable person standard in a negligence case as an example of an
explicit male norm.
108. Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
109. Id. at 505; see also Steven M. Recht, "M" is For Money: Baby M and the Surrogate
Motherhood Controversy, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1013, 1022 n.58 (1988) (discussing the pros
and cons of surrogacy and whether a "reasonable woman" is capable of weighing the
risks and benefits of becoming a surrogate).
110. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting);Jensen v. Eve-
leth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1991); Carrillo v. Ward, 770 F. Supp.
815, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Tindall v. Housing Auth. of Fort Smith, 762 F. Supp. 259,
262 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Austen v. Hawaii, 759 F. Supp. 612, 628 (D. Haw. 1991);
Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
111. 805 F.2d at 623 (Keith, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 615.
113. Id. at 624. In addition, other male co-workers displayed obscene pictures of
nude or scantily clad women in offices and common work areas. Id.
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sion that the plaintiff had failed to prove that she had been the victim
of hostile environment sexual harassment.114
The majority in Rabidue applied a reasonable person standard.15
The court stated that the supervisor's obscenities "although annoy-
ing, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of
the plaintiff or other female employees."] 16 Quoting the district
court, the majority stated,
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may
abound. Title VII was not meant to... change this. It must never
be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the
struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female workers
of America. But it is quite different to claim that Title VII was
designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mo-
res of American workers. "17
In dissent, Judge Keith argued that the reasonable person stan-
dard "fails to account for the wide divergence between most wo-
men's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men."tt8
Judge Keith maintained that the court should adopt a reasonable wo-
man standard which would allow courts to consider important socio-
logical differences.' '9 Judge Keith further explained that, unless the
reasonable woman standard is adopted, the defendants and the
courts will be "permitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable
behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men."1 20 Judge
Keith admitted that the plaintiff possessed undesirable personality
traits, but that they were clearly no worse than those of her
supervisor:
Title VII's precise purpose is to prevent such behavior and atti-
tudes from poisoning the work environment of classes protected
under the Act. As I believe no woman should be subjected to an
environment where her sexual dignity and reasonable sensibilities
are visually, verbally or physically assaulted as a matter of prevail-
ing male prerogative, I dissent.' 2'
2. Yates v. Avco Corp.
In 1987, a different panel of the Sixth Circuit expressly adopted
one of the main arguments in Judge Keith's dissent, "that sexual har-
114. Id. at 622, aft'g, 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
115. Id. at 627.
116. Id. at 622.
117. Id. at 620-21 (quoting Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430).
118. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting) (citing Comment, Sexual Harassment Claims of
Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984)).
119. Id. Judge Keith also noted that a reasonable woman standard would shield
employers from the neurotic complainant. Id.
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 626-27.
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assment actions should be viewed from the victim's perspective." 22
In Yates v. Avco Corp., two female plaintiffs were "bombarded" with
unwelcome invitations for drinks and meals from the same supervi-
sor, Sanders.' 2 3 Sanders discussed numerous personal matters, such
as the lack of a sexual relationship with his wife, and made obscene
references to parts of one plaintiff's body.124 The continued harass-
ment not only tormented the two plaintiffs, Street and Mathis, but it
created hostility between them and the other members of the depart-
ment who resented the plaintiffs' familiarity with Sanders.'25
Under the circumstances in Yates, the Sixth Circuit found that a
hostile and abusive environment existed, thus violating Title VII.
The harassing conduct complained of in Yates was similar to the con-
duct alleged in Rabidue. Unlike the majority in Rabidue, however, the
Yates court applied the reasonable woman standard in assessing the
seriousness of the alleged conduct. 126
The Yates court found that, in a sexual harassment case involving a
male supervisor's harassment of a female subordinate, the person
standing in the shoes of the employee should be a reasonable wo-
man.1 2 7 The court also acknowledged the fact that when a sexual
harassment suit involves a male subordinate allegedly being harassed
by a female supervisor, a "reasonable man" standard should apply.
The court underscored the necessity of a gender-related standard
stating, "men and women are vulnerable in different ways and of-
fended by different behavior."128
Since Yates, a number of other courts have discussed the reason-
able woman standard briefly in evaluating the conduct of an alleged
harasser. 129
3. Ellison v. Brady
In January, 1991, the Ninth Circuit focused on the reasonable wo-
122. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987).
123. Id. at 632.
124. Id. at 632. One plaintiff testified that Sanders "incessantly asked her to
lunch, dinner and drinks, mentioned sleeping together on more than one occasion,
tried to discuss his and her personal relationships and made frequent sexually sug-
gestive comments." Id.
125. Id. Both plaintiffs, Street and Mathis, took extended periods of sick leave in
attempts to avoid the harassment. Id. at 632-33.
126. Id. at 637.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 637 n.2.
129. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City
of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990); Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs.
Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587,
605 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
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man standard as the primary issue on appeal. In Ellison v. Brady, the
Ninth Circuit discussed what test should be applied in determining
whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile
working environment.1 30 The court, in effect, changed the standard
in the Ninth Circuit from a reasonable person standard, with implied
"stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior," to a reasonable wo-
man standard.1Sl
Kerry Ellison worked as an agent for the Internal Revenue Service
in San Mateo, California. A co-worker, Sterling Gray, repeatedly
asked Ellison out and sent her several strange letters.t32 Ellison,
frightened and upset by Gray's advances, reported the incidents to
her supervisor, Bonnie Miller.133 Miller discussed the situation with
her supervisor and subsequently transferred Gray to the San Fran-
cisco office for a period of six months.134 Two months after Gray
transferred to San Francisco, Miller wrote Ellison a letter stating that
Gray would be returning to the San Mateo office. The letter stated
that management decided to resolve Ellison's problem with a six-
month separation, and that additional action would be taken if
necessary.' 3 5
When Gray returned, he sought joint counseling. He wrote Elli-
son another letter maintaining that he and Ellison had some type of
130. 924 F.2d at 873.
131. Id. at 878 (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615, 3112, C at 3242
(1988)).
132. Id. at 873-75. The first note Gray wrote to Ellison read: "I cried over you last
night and I'm totally drained today. I have never been in such constant term oil [sic].
Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel your hatred for another
day," Id. at 874. A few days later, Gray mailed Ellison a card and a typed, three-page
letter which Ellison described as "twenty times, a hundred times weirder" than the
prior note. Id. In part, Gray wrote:
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex.... Leaving aside
the hassles and disasters of recent weeks. I have enjoyed you so much over
these past few months. Watching you. Experiencing you from 0 [sic] so far
away. Admiring your style and elan .... Don't you think it odd that two
people who have never even talked together, alone, are striking off such
intense sparks .... I will [write] another letter in the near future.
Id.
133. Id. Bonnie Miller was the supervisor to both Ellison and Gray. Ellison re-
quested that Miller transfer either her or Gray to another location because she felt
extremely uncomfortable working with him. Id.
134. Id. After discussing the problem with her supervisor, Miller had a counseling
session with Gray. She told Gray that he was entitled to union representation, but
stated that he must leave Ellison alone. Over the next few weeks Miller reminded
Gray on several occasions not to make contact with Ellison in any way. Id.
135. Three weeks after being transferred, Gray filed union grievances requesting
that he be returned to the San Mateo office. The IRS and the union agreed to his
return, provided that he spend four more months in San Francisco and that he prom-
ise not to contact Ellison again. Miller wrote Ellison to inform her of the decision.
Id.
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relationship.136 After receiving Miller's letter, Ellison was "frantic"
and filed a formal complaint with her employer alleging sexual har-
assment. 13 7 The employer rejected Ellison's claim, finding that the
complaint did not describe a pattern or practice of sexual harassment
covered by EEOC regulations.138 Shortly thereafter, Ellison filed a
complaint in federal district court alleging sexual harassment. The
district court held that Kerry Ellison did not state a prima facie case
of hostile environment sexual harassment. The Ninth Circuit
reversed. 13 9
The opinion in Ellison suggested that a complete understanding of
the victim's perspective required an evaluation of the different per-
spectives of men and women.140 Men tend to perceive certain forms
of conduct to be perfectly legitimate, whereas a woman may find the
same form of conduct objectionable.141 The court stated that a
fairer outcome in these cases would be achieved if the trier of fact
would assess the conduct of the alleged harasser against a reasonable
woman standard.142
The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasonable woman standard as a
necessary step toward effective adjudication of sexual harassment
claims under Title VII.143 The court adopted the perspective of a
reasonable woman primarily because it believed "that a sex-blind
reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women."' 44 The court's
goal was to provide a gender-conscious examination of sexual har-
assment which would enable "women to participate in the workplace
on equal footing with men."t45
In addition, the Ellison opinion cited prevention as the best way to
136. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 874-75.
137. Id. at 874. The IRS employee investigating the complaint agreed with Bon-
nie Miller that Gray's conduct constituted sexual harassment. Id. at 875.
138. Id. After an appeal, the EEOC affirmed the Treasury Department's decision
on another ground. The EEOC concluded that the agency had taken appropriate
steps to prevent the repetition of Gray's conduct. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 878.
141. Id.; see Schoenheider, supra note 39, at 1486. In the context of sexual harass-
ment law, applying an objective standard of reasonableness would fail to account for
the unequal relationship between the sexes, which gives rise to sexual harassment:
Sex is peculiarly an area where a presumption of gender sameness, orjudg-
ments by men of woman, are not illuminating as standards for equal treat-
ment, since to remind a man of his sexuality is to build his sense of potency,
while for a man to remind a woman of hers is often experienced as intrusive,
denigrating, and depotentiating.
Id. (quoting MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 5, at 171).
142. Id. at 879.
143. Id. at 880.
144. Id. at 879.
145. Id.
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eliminate sexual harassment in the workplace.146 The court urged
employers to educate and sensitize their employees to reduce and
eliminate conduct which a reasonable woman or victim would con-
sider sexual harassment.147 The Ellison court stated, "When employ-
ers and employees internalize the standard of workplace conduct we
establish today, the current gap in perception between the sexes will
be bridged."148
4. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
Lois Robinson, a female welder at Jacksonville Shipyards, sued her
employers, alleging that they created and encouraged a sexually hos-
tile and intimidating environment.14 9 Robinson claimed that pic-
tures of women in various stages of undress, in addition to
demeaning remarks from male employees and supervisors, consti-
tuted sexual harassment.150
The district court held that Lois Robinson had supported her
claim of a hostile work environment.151 The court found that Jack-
sonville Shipyard's management "condoned these displays and often
had their own pictures."152 Several of the defendant managers testi-
fied that there was nothing wrong with pictures of naked or partially
naked women posted in the workplace.153
Robinson's testimony, on the other hand, illustrated how the pic-
tures and comments created a "visual assault on the sensibilities of
female workers at Jacksonville Shipyards that did not relent during
working hours." 154 The court focused on the different ways in which
men and women perceive the same conduct and admitted expert tes-
timony to prove the differences.'55 The court held that the appro-
priate objective standard for judging gender-related conduct is the
reasonable woman standard.156
Several other federal district court cases have employed a reason-
able woman standard to evaluate conduct in discrimination suits.
146. Id. at 880 (quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1991)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 881.
149. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1490 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1491.
152. Id. at 1494. For example, one manager had been aware of the Playboy- and
Penthouse-style pictures posted in the workplace which portrayed nude women for
years, yet he refused to issue a policy prohibiting the display of such pictures. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1495.
155. Id. at 1502-09.
156. Id. at 1524. The court stated, "A reasonable woman would find that the
working environment at [Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.] was abusive." Id.
1992]
21
Westman: The Reasonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexual Harassment in th
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
For example, in Harris v. International Paper Co.,157 a Maine federal
district court stated, "the standard for assessing the unwelcomeness
and pervasiveness of conduct and speech must be founded on a fair
concern for the different social experiences of men and women in
the case of sexual harassment."158 The Harris court cited the reason-
able woman standard as the appropriate standard in evaluating gen-
der-related conduct.159
C. Sexual Harassment Cases in the Eighth Circuit
1. Moylan v. Maries County
In 1986, the Eighth Circuit held, in Moylan v. Maries County, that a
sexually hostile work environment violates Title VII.160 Prior to
Moylan v. Maries County, the Eighth Circuit had not considered this
issue.161 In the same opinion, the court relied on the five-part test
for deciding hostile environment claims set forth in Henson v. City of
Dundee. 16 2 The court also relied heavily on the Final Guidelines on Sex-
ual Harassment in the Work Place, issued by the EEOC in 1981.163
The plaintiff, Charlotte Moylan, an ambulance dispatcher, filed an
employment discrimination action against the sheriff and county.' 64
157. 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991).
158. Id. at 1515; see also Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st
Cir. 1988).
159. Haris, 765 F. Supp. at 1515. The court also suggested that the same type of
understanding be brought to race-related conduct. Id.
160. 792 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1986). Surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit held that
a hostile environment violates Title VII on June 9, 1986, just 10 days before the
United States Supreme Court issued the same holding in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
161. Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749. The Eighth Circuit agreed by stating, "a discrimina-
tory work environment was a violation of Title VII because it constituted sex discrim-
ination with respect to the 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment.' " Moylan,
792 F.2d at 749 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). In
Bundy, the court said, "unless Title VII was extended to such actions, an 'employer
could sexually harass a female employee.'" 641 F.2d at 945. This would create a
hostile working environment, while carefully stopping short of taking any tangible
action against her in response to her resistance. Id.; see also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-05 (11 th
Cir. 1982).
162. Moylan, 792 F.2d at 750 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-
05 (11 th Cir. 1982)). In determining a claim, a court should consider whether the
plaintiff proved that:
(1) she belongs to a protected group, (2) she was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment, (3) the harassment was based on sex, (4) the harass-
ment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment, and (5) the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and
failed to take proper remedial action.
Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 746.
[Vol. 18
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 18
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/18
REASONABLE WOMAN
Moylan testified that during her employment as a dispatcher in the
Sheriff's office, Sheriff French made numerous sexual advances,
which were neither solicited nor welcomed by her. 165 The Eighth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, which had not been
previously considered.166
In Moylan, the Eighth Circuit stated that to violate Title VII, the
alleged harassment must affect a "term, condition, or privilege of
employment."' 167 Additionally, the court found that sexual harass-
ment must be "sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
employment and create abusive working environment for a sexually
hostile work environment" to violate Title VII.168 The Eighth Cir-
cuit stated that an employee who claims hostile environment sexual
harassment must be able to show a practice or pattern of sustained
and nontrivial harassing conduct.169 In evaluating the sexual harass-
ment hostile environment claim in Moylan, the court stressed the im-
portance of focusing on "the totality of the circumstances." 170
2. Hall v. Gus Construction Co.
In 1988, the Eighth Circuit decided Hall v. Gus Construction Co. 171
Gus Construction Co. and one of its foremen, John Mundorf, ap-
pealed a judgment imposing liability under Title VII and the Iowa
Civil Rights Act. 172 A group of female traffic controllers claimed that
they were constructively discharged as a result of a hostile and abu-
sive working environment and brought a civil rights claim against the
road construction company and their supervisor.173
In Hall, the Eighth Circuit held that verbal abuse and offensive
touching by co-workers was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of. . . employment and create an abusive working
environment" within the meaning of Title VII.174 The court applied
the facts to the five-part test to make its determination. The court,
for the first time, stated, "the predicate acts underlying a sexual har-
165. Id. at 747. Moylan alleged that the sheriff repeatedly came into her office
during employee's hours and sexually harassed her by attempting to kiss her, to put
his arms around her and to fondle her. Id. at 749.
166. Id. at 750.
167. Id. at 749.
168. Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
169. Id. at 749-50. The court stated that single and isolated incidents of sexual
harassment generally will not be sufficient to state a claim (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.
2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)).
170. 792 F.2d at 750 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
171. 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
172. Id. at 1011.
173. Id. at 1012.
174. Id. at 1014-15.
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assment claim need not be clearly sexual in nature."' 175
The Eighth Circuit has continued to rely on the guidelines issued
by the EEOC in more recent decisions.176 The Eighth Circuit has
not specifically addressed the idea of a reasonable woman standard
as it pertains to sexual harassment cases, however.
3. Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co.
In 1991, a federal district court in Minnesota also adopted the rea-
sonable woman standard.177 The court briefly discussed and then
adopted the reasonable woman standard pursuant to an evaluation
for class certification.178 Plaintiffs alleged discrimination on the ba-
sis of gender in violation of both Title VII and the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. 179 The court specifically rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that sexual harassment claims should not be addressed on a
class-wide basis because reactions to profanity, pornography, or
other potentially offensive material are highly individualized. The
court found that the correct standard is whether a reasonable woman
would find the work environment hostile.180 Jensen is the first federal
district court case within the Eighth Circuit to adopt the reasonable
woman standard.
III. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT SHOULD ADOPT THE REASONABLE WOMAN
STANDARD
Women are most often the victims of sexual harassment in the
workplace.181 The Eighth Circuit should adopt the reasonable wo-
175. Id. at 1014 (citing Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir.
1987); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The Eighth Circuit
specifically adopted the rationale in McKinney, that "any harassment or other unequal
treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the sex
of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an
illegal condition of employment under Title VII." McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138.
The Hall court noted that the EEOC Guidelines define sexual harassment as ex-
plicit sexual behavior. The court also noted that the Guidelines do not rule out the
consideration of other types of harassment. Hall, 842 F.2d at 1013-14.
176. See Bartunek v. Bubak, 941 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1991); Hawkins v. Hennepin
Technical Ctr., 900 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1990); Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d 996
(8th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Wesco Inv., Inc., 846 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988).
177. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1991).
178. Id. at 662-63.
179. MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.15 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
180. Jensen, 139 F.R.D. at 665.
181. A survey of federal employees conducted in 1987 revealed that over 40% of
female federal employees reported incidents of sexual harassment in 1987, about the
same number as in 1980. In the same survey, only 14% of men surveyed reported
incidents of harassment. Again, this is roughly the same number as in 1980. See
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 n.15 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. MERIT SYS. PRO-
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man standard as a means of reducing sexual harassment and as an
important step in creating greater equality in the workplace.
A. The Concept of the "Reasonable Woman"
One may ask, what is a reasonable woman? What are her expecta-
tions? Is the reasonable woman standard really necessary? When
should the standard apply? Exactly how will a judge or jury apply
the standard? Answers to some of these questions are addressed in
the reasonable woman cases surveyed in this note. Yet, many of
these questions deserve more attention to introduce the reasonable
woman standard to lawyers and judges.
First, what is a reasonable woman, and what are her expectations?
A reasonable woman could be described as a woman with reasonable
expectations concerning what is appropriate and inappropriate, what
is fair and unfair. The reasonable woman attempts to encompass
that which is fair, proper, just, and suitable under the circumstances,
while taking into consideration a backdrop of female life exper-
iences. A reasonable woman has expectations of a tolerable, even
pleasant work environment; equal pay for equal work; and opportu-
nities for advancement based on merit.
The next question raised is whether the reasonable woman stan-
dard is really necessary? The answer to this question is yes, abso-
lutely. If the Eighth Circuit adopts the reasonable woman standard
as the appropriate standard, the court will evaluate the seriousness
of the harasser's conduct by focusing on the female victim's perspec-
tive. This is likely to be more restrictive than a man's perspective. In
doing so, the Eighth Circuit will be sending a message to employers
that courts are taking an increasingly aggressive stance against sexual
harassment in the workplace and that unwelcome sexual conduct will
not be tolerated. Employers will be forced to listen to female victims
and take their complaints seriously. As a result, the Eighth Circuit
will further implement the promise of equal opportunity in the work-
place as set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.182
Third, when should the reasonable woman standard apply? The
reasonable woman standard should apply to all cases involving sex-
ual harassment of women, regardless of circumstances concerning
job type or salary level. One may argue that the reasonable woman
standard is an "enlightened woman's standard" and should apply
TECTION BD., OFFICE OF POLICY & EVALUATION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FED.
GOV'T: AN UPDATE 11 (1988)).
182. See Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in
the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1737-38 (1989) (arguing that to fully
implement the promise of Title VII, "the standards for assessing women's psycholog-
ical harm due to harassment must begin to reflect women's sensitivity to behavior
once condoned as acceptable").
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only to cases involving well-educated female professionals. Reason-
ing in support of this argument suggests that women working in
traditional, low-paying jobs have different expectations and more
readily accept intolerable work conditions as a way of life. Such an
argument fails to consider the fact that poorly educated, low-paid
female workers are often the most vulnerable to various forms of dis-
crimination on the job. Women who work in traditional low-paying
jobs may have limited opportunities and may not be able to leave
even the most intolerable work environment.
The bottom line is that explicit, degrading, objectionable, sexist
behavior does not belong in any workplace, regardless of job type
and salary level. The reasonable woman standard centers on the
need to include a woman's perspective when evaluating whether par-
ticular workplace behavior amounts to harassment. The type of job
or level of salary is irrelevant.
Finally, how will a judge or jury apply the standard? A judge or
jury will ask the following question: would the actions of the defend-
ant have affected the reasonable woman?' 83 The totality of the cir-
cumstances, as well as the perspective of the victim, must be taken
into consideration. The plaintiff must establish that an objective
standard of harm is satisfied.18 4 Because the reasonable woman
standard is an objective one, employers should be protected from
hypersensitive complainants.
B. The Reasonable Person Standard Is No Longer Adequate
The Eighth Circuit currently applies the EEOC reasonable person
standard when determining whether harassment is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to create a hostile environment. The EEOC states,
the harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective
standpoint of a "reasonable person." Title VII does not serve "as
a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersen-
sitive." Thus, if the challenged conduct would not substantially af-
fect the work environment of a reasonable person, no violation
should be found.... Consideration should be given to the context
in which the alleged harassment took place.' 8 5
183. Smolsky v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 780 F. Supp. 283, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
184. EEOC v. Blue Diamond Growers Ass'n, No. 90-2281, 1992 WL 16326
(D.N.J. Jan. 28, 1992).
185. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615, 3114, at 3274 (1990) (citations omitted).
The following example was given:
Charging Party alleges that her co-worker made repeated unwelcome sexual
advances toward her. An investigation discloses that the alleged "advances"
consisted of invitations to join a group of employees who regularly social-
ized at dinner after work. The co-worker's invitations, viewed in that con-
text and from the perspective of a reasonable person, would not have
created a hostile environment and therefore did not constitute sexual
harassment.
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The Guidelines also briefly mention Judge Keith's dissent in Rabidue
v. Osceola Refining Co., stating that the reasonable person standard
should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions
of acceptable behavior.186
The theoretically gender-neutral reasonable person standard
adopted by the EEOC and the Eighth Circuit is no longer ade-
quate.' 8 7 The reasonable person standard typifies a traditional,
male-dominated workplace and is a product of a white, male judici-
ary.188 The surveyed cases demonstrate that traditional male stan-
dards, when applied to a set of facts involving a woman can
potentially yield unfair, even ridiculous results.
Most courts apply the reasonable person standard rather than the
reasonable man standard, yet the very concept of reasonableness
rarely includes points of view other than male.189 Several commen-
tators have argued that much of legal history has ignored "other"
points of view in formulating a unitary standard of reasonableness,
and that many "others" believe that there cannot be any one concept
of reasonableness.190 Susan Estrich, Leslie Bender, and other com-
mentators have expanded the idea of more than one standard of rea-
sonableness into other areas of the law such as rape, negligence, and
self-defense.t19 Certainly, the same type of approach applies to sex-
ual harassment cases.
One may argue that application of a reasonable woman standard
could be difficult because acceptable workplace behaviors are not
well defined. Arguably, a judge or jury could have some difficulty
deciding whether or not a reasonable woman would be justified in
viewing certain conduct as sexual harassment. Courts should focus
on an objective woman's perspective.
First, consider the workplace of today. In most offices, women
work for men.19 2 Because men have historically dominated the labor
market, the workplace overwhelmingly reflects values consistent with
Id.
186. Id.
187. Maxine N. Eichner, Note, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's Work: Chal-
lenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 YALE LJ. 1397, 1399 n.8 (1988)
(arguing that gender neutrality is simply the male standard).
188. See Abrams, supra note 4, at 1203. "In evaluating [sexual harassment] claims,
courts often must choose between the conflicting views of the alleged harassment.
Because most judges are men, who have experienced the traditional forms of male
socialization, their instinctive reaction is to accept the perspective of the employer."
Id.
189. Peter Linzer & Patricia A. Tidwell, Letter to David Dow-Friendly Critic and Criti-
cal Friend, 28 Hous. L. REV. 861, 862 (1991).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 862; see generally Estrich, supra note 106; Bender, supra note 6.
192. Certainly many women work for women; however, men continue to dominate
most upper-level management positions.
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male roles and rewards masculine choices while ignoring and penal-
izing choices consistent with female roles.193 As one commentator
suggests, a complex set of societal norms has "systematically deval-
ued the choices, values, and behaviors of women that tend to be dif-
ferent from those of men."94 As a result of male control over most
workplaces, male views of appropriate sexual behavior in the work-
place remain the norm. A woman's complaint of sexual harassment
is often not taken seriously and internal remedial procedures fail.195
Second, when internal remedial measures fail to improve the work
environment, a woman is forced to choose between tolerating a diffi-
cult and abusive situation or risking losing herjob, salary, and future
opportunities on the outcome of an unpredictable lawsuit.196 If a
woman chooses to bring suit, the critical legal issue is whether the
alleged conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create "an in-
timidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."'97 The
Ninth Circuit has determined that a victim's perspective is para-
mount when deciding the issue. Thus, if the victim is a woman, the
reasonable woman standard should be used. The primary thrust of
the reasonable woman standard is to reduce, and not to reinforce the
prevailing stereotypes and discriminatory practices which exist in the
workplace. 198
The standard should be refined to reflect situations and viewpoints
based on mutual experiences and common points of view. The rea-
sonable woman standard shields women from the offensive behavior
that results from the divergence of male and female perceptions of
appropriate conduct. Women generally hold more restrictive views
of both the situation and the type of relationship in which sexual
193. Seidenfeld, supra note 10, at 271.
194. Abrams, supra note 4, at 1185.
195. Abrams, supra note 4, at 1202-03.
Because men are most often the perpetrators of such conduct, they have not
been compelled to consider how it feels to be a recipient. Moreover, be-
cause men still exercise control over most workplaces, their views of sexual
behavior in the workplace remain the norm, the measure of "business as
usual."
Id.
196. James Gruber, a University of Michigan sociologist and expert on workplace
harassment, states, "Even if [women] recognize themselves as victims of sexual har-
assment, many perceive that bringing it out into the open will only backfire on
them." Leslie Dreyfous, Women in Workplace Coming Forward After Thomas Allegations,
MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct. 10, 1991, at 8A; see also Joan Fluegel, Note, Sexual Harassment
and Battery: Mutually Exclusive Remedies for Independent Harms, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
627, 628 (1991).
197. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), § 615, 3114, at 3274 (1990).
198. Steven H. Winterbauer, Sexual Harassment-The Reasonable Woman Standard, 7
LABOR LAw. 811, 818 (1991).
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conduct is appropriate.199 Although many women have positive atti-
tudes about uncoerced sex, their greater physical and social vulnera-
bility to sexual coercion can make some women cautious of such
encounters. 20 0 Arguably, what may be sexual harassment to one wo-
man may be innocent flirtation to another.20 1 However, the idea is
to focus on what an objective, reasonable woman would believe
under the circumstances. The standard is not intended to be de-
scriptive of all women.
Cases which have employed the reasonable woman standard have,
in effect, "expanded the interpretation of sexual harassment, which
should make it easier for victims to prove prima facie claims." 2 0 2 Ar-
guably, by making it easier to bring a claim, the courts may be
flooded with lawsuits alleging sexual harassment. However, the rea-
sonable woman standard is not meant to protect or accommodate
the "idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee."
Courts and commentators generally agree that Title VII should not
be used as a vehicle to vindicate the petty slights of the oversensi-
tive.203 Instead, the trier of fact should focus on what is reasonable
under the circumstances, while at the same time, taking into account
the perspective of the victim.204
In addition, the EEOC guidelines may help to reduce or circum-
vent the potential for more sexual harassment lawsuits. The guide-
lines state that, in order to be actionable, sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct must be se-
vere enough to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
199. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 n.9 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Abrams,
supra note 4, at 1205).
200. Abrams, supra note 4, at 1205.
Moreover, American women have been raised in a society where rape and
sex-related violence have reached unprecedented levels .... Because of the
inequality and coercion with which it is so frequently associated in the minds
of women, the appearance of sexuality in an unexpected context ... can be
an anguishing experience.
Id.
201. See Adrienne T. Washington, Clear Definition Needed in Law of Sexual Harassment
at Work, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, Met. Life sec., at 1.
202. Winterbauer, supra note 199, at 817-18. In discussing Ellison, Winterbauer
points out that the district court applied the reasonable person standard and granted
summary judgment to the employer. Id. The district court held that no reasonable
juror could conclude that the alleged harassment would be sufficiently offensive to a
reasonable person in the same circumstances. The Ninth Circuit, however, adopted
the reasonable woman standard and reversed, concluding that the claim should not
be dismissed. Id.
203. Lipsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (D.P.R. 1987); Zabkowicz v.
West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Wis. 1984).
204. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); accord Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith,J., dissenting) ( argu-
ing for adoption of the reasonable woman standard).
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create a hostile working environment. Courts are urged to consider
the "totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the ad-
vances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred." 20 5
If these guidelines are followed, ultra-sensitive plaintiff cases will be
dismissed early in the proceedings, and innocent defendants will not
be penalized.
Opponents of the reasonable woman standard might argue that by
creating a gender-specific standard, courts will be encouraging the
creation of race-specific standards, religious-specific standards, and
so on. Although this proposition may have some merit, the effect of
creating race- or religion-based standards may be positive. For ex-
ample, one court argued that to give full force to
the differing perspectives which exist in society, the standard for
assessing the unwelcomeness and pervasiveness of conduct and
speech must be founded on a fair concern for the different social
experiences of men and women in the case of sexual harassment,
and of white Americans and black Americans in the case of racial
harassment. 2 06
The purpose in adopting the reasonable woman standard is to
change and eliminate prevailing stereotypes in the workplace. Cer-
tainly the same type of analysis applies to race-related or religious-
related conduct as well. As two commentators wrote: "there are
many other points of view which have been invisible to most people
because society treats today's norms as if they are the only
norms."207
C. The Reasonable Woman Standard Would Create Greater Equality in
the Workplace
The principal litigation tool for broader job opportunities is Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. Title VII provides equal opportunity
through the removal of artificial barriers to employment.208 As one
court explained, the purpose of Title VII is to prevent the "perpetua-
tion of stereotypes and a sense of degradation which serve to close
or discourage employment opportunities for women." 209 If courts
continue to endorse a reasonable person standard in the assessment
of alleged sexual harassment, courts risk the further entrenchment of
stereotypical views of harassment in the workplace.210 Discrimina-
205. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1991).
206. Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Me. 1991).
207. Linzer & Tidwell, supra note 189, at 861.
208. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
209. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that derogatory language directed at women and pornographic pictures of women
serve as evidence of a hostile working environment).
210. Abrams, supra note 4, at 1202.
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tion because of sex will remain largely unchecked and artificial
boundaries preventing women from job promotions and better pay
will remain unbroken. Title VII could be a useful tool in combatting
sexual harassment, and would, in effect, make the workplace a more
tolerable place for both men and women, but courts must change the
way in which they evaluate the alleged conduct. 2 11
Title VII presents an opportunity to redress the imbalance of con-
trol in the workplace, but its potential in the area of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment law has been hampered by the lack of
judicial enforcement.212 By defining sexual harassment as any con-
duct which a reasonable woman finds hostile or offensive, a woman's
opinion will carry equal weight. The reasonable woman standard
does not establish a higher standard. Instead, it allows women to
participate in the workplace on an equal footing with men.
The law is slowly catching up to the evolving social norms con-
cerning women's rights in the workplace, yet more work must be
done. Many crucial changes still need to be made in order to reduce
the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the workplace and create
greater equality for women. "Women who fought for access to jobs,
property, and the political arena have discovered that increased ac-
cess alone does not create conditions in which equality is possi-
ble."213 Courts and society have only recently come to the
realization that the white, male-dominated view of appropriate con-
duct in the workplace is not the only view.214
211. Id. at 1203 n.86.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1184-85.
214. During the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, the public took a grim
view of the way in which the all-male Senate Judiciary Committee handled Professor
Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment. "Hill's allegations, and accusations
that the [Senate] Judiciary Committee failed properly to investigate them, have
brought to a boil anger about sexual harassment-and the silence that reinforces it."
Leslie Dreyfous, Women Coming Forward After Thomas Allegations, MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct.
10, 1991, at 8A; see also Ellen Goodman, Her Word Deserves a Hearing, MPLS. STAR
TRIB., Oct. 10, 1991, at 18A. "[L]ike businessmen running a private corporation,
[the Senate Judiciary Committee] handled this 'delicate matter' discreetly, among
their own kind .... It was her word versus his. They took his without hearing hers.
They didn't tell the rest of us." Goodman, supra, at 18A.
Helen Norton, an attorney at the Women's Legal Defense Fund in Washington,
said that by initially downplaying Hill's charges, senators were "furthering and legiti-
mizing the all-too-common societal response of blaming the victim." Beth Frerknig,
Anita Hill Touches a Nerve, MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct. 9, 1991, at 12A. Anna Quindlen,
syndicated columnist for the New York Times, wrote:
One of the most difficult things about bringing sexual harassment charges is
that it is usually one woman against the corporate power structure, against
the boss who says she's imagining things and a bulwark of male authority
that surrounds him. David against the Goliaths.... Listen to us. To trivial-
ize the allegations of [Anita Hill] by moving ahead without painstaking in-
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The development and adoption of the reasonable woman standard
is one small but important step toward reducing sexual harassment
in the workplace and creating equality for women. Judge Keith's dis-
sent in Rabidue, and Judge Breezer's majority opinion in Ellison, are
excellent examples of an updated and enlightened approach to deal-
ing with the issue of sexual harassment. 215 These opinions reflect a
growing trend among courts.2 16
An analysis of the facts in any one of the cases surveyed suggests
that the differences in perceptions among the alleged harassers and
the female victim are dramatic. For example, if one were to analyze
the facts in Ellison from the perspective of the alleged harasser's
viewpoint, Sterling Gray could be characterized as a desperate man
in love.217 By focusing on a male perspective, rather than the per-
spective of the victim, it is understandable that the district court
characterized Gray's conduct as isolated and trivial.218 But to Kerry
vestigation sends a message: that no matter what we accomplish, we are still
seen as oversensitive schoolgirls or duplicitous scorned women.
Anna Quindlen, Lest It Trivialize Women, Senate Must Listen, MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct. 10,
1991, at 19A.
215. For a specific commentary on the court's movement away from traditional,
male-oriented philosophy, see Earnest Calderon, Two More Nails in the Coffin of Pater-
nalism, ARz. A-r'Y, Sept. 28, 1991 at 14. Calderon suggests that the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Ellison is a step in the direction towards equality in what has been a male-
dominated business world. Id.
216. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting);Jensen v. Eve-
leth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1991); Carrillo v. Ward, 770 F. Supp.
815, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Tindall v. Housing Auth. of Fort Smith, 762 F. Supp. 259,
278 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1540 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Austin v. University of Hawaii, 759 F. Supp. 612, 628 (D.
Haw. 1991); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 577 (W.D.N.Y.
1987).
217. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880 ("Gray could be portrayed as a modern day
Cyrano de Bergerac wishing no more than to woo Ellison with his words."); see also
Suzanne Fields, When Suitors Lust for Suers, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at 3G:
Pity poor Sterling Gray. If only he'd been born with a golden tongue,
or a poet's soul, or the sensitive hands to wield a quill quivering with pas-
sion ...
But Sterling Gray was merely a man of his times who had the misfor-
tune to fall in love. He lacked the gift to rhapsodize with quick wit or savage
charm. He was lost without a Cyrano de Bergerac to do the wooing for
him....
Sterling Gray's sparks struck only wood in the heart of Miss Ellison, and the
wood was wet. She went not to Cupid to complain, but, being a woman of
her time, to a lawyer. With her fuses dormant, responding not at all to the
electric pulses from the desk next to hers, she sued, charging sexual
harassment.
Id. Fields' portrayal of Sterling Gray as a modern version of Cyrano de Bergerac may
be comical to some, but not to all.
218. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
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REASONABLE WOMAN
Ellison, Gray's behavior was both disruptive and frightening, seri-
ously affecting her ability to be productive on the job.
As a result of adopting the reasonable woman standard as the stan-
dard in assessing the pervasiveness of the conduct in a sexual harass-
ment suit, working women will benefit. Victims of sexual
harassment, like Kerry Ellison, will have recourse before productivity
is affected. Employers will be encouraged to develop and implement
effective methods of investigating claims. Judge Breezer, who wrote
the majority opinion in Ellison v. Brady, stated that prevention is the
best way to avoid sexual harassment in the workplace.219 Judge
Breezer urged employers to "educate and sensitize their
workforce"2 2o to eliminate conduct which a reasonable woman
would consider offensive and discriminatory.221 Adopting a reason-
able woman standard would send a message to employers to
strengthen internal grievance procedures by making them more sen-
sitive to women, more "women-friendly." As a result, employers
might take adequate action sooner and prevent the filing of a lawsuit.
Employers will be encouraged to include women as part of internal
grievance procedures. On-the-job training programs can be imple-
mented to inform and sensitize employees. Harassment, when it
does occur, will be treated severely, with suspension, demotion or
firing. Women, in turn, may be more willing to confront difficult be-
havior before it becomes intolerable. In instances where workplace
behavior becomes intolerable, and a lawsuit must be filed, courts will
adopt the perspective of the victim and thus make an informed deci-
sion. The purpose of Title VII, to knock down artificial barriers to
employment opportunities such as promotions and better pay, will
be furthered.
IV. CONCLUSION
A standard that supposedly treats men and women the same begs a
question: The same as whom? The Eighth Circuit should adopt the
reasonable woman standard as a means of reducing sexual harass-
ment and as a small, but important, step in creating greater equality
in the workplace. As a result of adopting the standard, the defense
attorney will have to focus on the victim's perspective and show that
the plaintiff is not reasonable in her assessment of the situation in
order to be successful.222 The defense attorney's job will be more
219. Id.
220. Id. at 880.
22 1. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880. The EEOC also agrees that "[p]revention is the best
tool for the elimination of sexual harassment in the workplace." EEOC Guidelines,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1991).
222. Jean Hopfensperger & Paul McEnroe, Confusion Exists on Issue of Harassing,
MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct. 13, 1991, at IA, 4A-5A.
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difficult. In an attempt to circumvent this problem, employers will
more readily develop and adopt preventive programs to deal with
the subtleties of sexual harassment. In turn, the workplace will be-
come a more tolerant place for both men and women.
Bonnie B. Westman
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